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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
In the U.S., financial support for commodity research and promotion programs
frequently comes from production assessments or check-offs. These programs are
designed to increase demand for products or improve production techniques and varieties.
The benefits are generally non-excludable public goods that are available on an
unrestricted basis to all producers.
Many marketing orders have provisions that allow producers to request a refund of
their contributions. Producers who request refunds become free riders because they
receive the non-excludable producer benefits from program expenditures but do not pay
their share ofthe costs.
Oklahoma Wheat Research and Promotion
Fourteen states have wheat research and promotion programs and ofthose 14,
nine states allow producers to request a refimd oftheir contribution. Oklahoma has the
highest percentage ofrefunds, at 11 percent. Although Oklahoma recently approved
legislation to double the assessment, it still has a lower assessment than many ofthe other
states (fable 1). Producers are also given a longer time to request refunds, 120 days.
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Table I. Assessment and Refund Provisions ofWheat Commission Programs, by
State. 1994-95,
Current Refund
State Assessment Provision
California $0.03/cwt. Yes
Colorado O.Ollbu. Yes·
Idaho O.02Jbu. No
Kansas 0.007/bu. Yes
Minnesota O.Ollbu. No
Montana O.Ollbu. Yes
Nebraska 0.0125/bu. No
North Dakota 0.005/bu. Yes
Oklahornab 0.015Ibu. Yes
Oregon 0.03Ibu. No
South Dakota O.Ollbu. Yes
Texas 0.015Ibu. Yes
Wyoming O.Ollbu. Yes
Washington .5% ofvalue No
Source: Jim Christianson, Montana Wheat Commission.
a. Some small refimds are not allowed.
b. Shows the new assessment.
Refund
Time Limit
90 days
30
n1a
365
n1a
90
n1a
60
120
n1a
60
60
90
n1a
Refund
Percentage
8.00%
0.01
n1a
8.00
n1a
2.30
n1a
3.97
11.00
n1a
1.20
5.90
not reported
n1a
In April 1965, Oklahoma wheat producers put a wheat check-off program in place
to help market the wheat surplus. The Oklahoma Wheat Resources Act established a
quarter cent per bushel check-offand created the Oklahoma Wheat Commission to handle
the funds (§2 a.s. Sec. 1022, 1023). The Oklahoma Wheat Commission consists offive
producers representing districts across the state (Figure 1). Elections are held in one
district each year for these board positions. Nominations come from area wheat producers
and then are voted on by secret ballot. The top three are then submitted to the Governor,
who in turn, appoints one ofthese producers to a five-year term.
Board members allocate funds generated by the check-off to research and
promotion activities, hoping to provide the best opportunities for profitability. At least 20
2
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Figure 1. Wheat Commission Districts
percent ofcheck-off funds, by law, are used to fund research (§2 O.S., Sec. 1030). The
check-offis collected when wheat is sold to a buyer such as a grain elevator, food
processing facility, feed lot, or other entity (Oklahoma Wheat Commission, 1997).
The check-off assessment was increased in 1979 and has currently been at three
fourths cent per bushel until a change in the Oklahoma Wheat ResourcesAct was passed
in February of 1998. The assessment was then increased to one and one-half cent per
bushel. The amendment went into effect on July I, 1998.
Wheat promotion programs are somewhat unique compared with those for other
grains because: I) wheat is conswned primarily by humans rather than being used for
livestock feed or oil; 2) wheat is one of the world's most consumed grains; 3) wheat is
graded and inspected differently from other grains; 4) freight rates are different for wheat;
and 5) international agreements for wheat are developed separately from the other grains
(Oklahoma Wheat Commission, 1997).
Importance of Requests for Refunds
The effects ofrefund requests on research and promotion efforts are sometimes
greater than the actual refimd amount because check-off dollars are sometimes matched by
other programs. For example, the Oklahoma Wheat Commission participates in the
Wheat Foods Council where producer check-offdollars are matched by milling and baking
industry support ofthe Council (Oklahoma Wheat Commission, 1997).
Commissions frequently spend a portion oftheir fimds on producer communication
and public relations tactics. These tactics are needed for general accountability and to
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reduce refimd rates. Refund request rates may be viewed as a measure ofproducer
satisfaction with commission programs.
Wheat Commissioners in Oklahoma regularly review lists ofproducers that request
refunds. Commissioners must decide how much time and money should be spent on
producer communication and public relations tactics, some ofwhich may help reduce
refund rates. Using fimds to report to producers, reduces funds available to support
promotion and research efforts. Ifproducers perceive that too much time and money are
being spent communicating with producers, some producers may be less willing to support
programs. At the same time, producers that do not know how the money they contribute
generates benefits to them may be more likely to request a reftmd. These issues are
particularly important in Oklahoma at the present time because of the recently changed
assessment rate, historically low wheat prices, and Oklahoma producers generally having a
higher propensity to become free-riders that benefit from the non-excludable public goods
created by the programs.
No major studies have been done to find out why some wheat producers ask the
wheat commissions for refunds and become free-riders. More important, there is little
known about how well producers understand the programs and activities ofthe
commissions. Free-riders may feel that others will contribute enough to fund the research
and promotion. Some producers may not know about the benefits of the programs. Other
producers who request refimds may believe that research and promotion are ineffective
and that there are no non-excludable public goods created by the programs so that they do
not perceive themselves to be free-riders.
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Propensities to request a refund may also depend on group norms. Norms specify
actions that are proper/correct or improper/incorrect. Nonns are usually enforced by
sanctions which are rewards for proper behavior or punishments for improper behavior
(Colem~ p. 142). Decision makers evaluate norms and potential sanctions when making
decisions (Colem~ p. 143). Sanctions may not be effective for wheat producers.
Analysis of the free-rider problem is of obvious interest to all voluntarily funded
commodity research and promotion commissions. If free-riding becomes the norm,
programs are likely to fail. If too much money must be spent encouraging participation,
programs have fewer funds to generate benefits for producers.
Objecttves
The general objective of this research is to provide information that will help
understand why refund requests are made by wheat producers. The information will be
used to evaluate alternative strategies that commissioners may use to reduce refund
request rates. The specific objective is to determine how economic and social factors,
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs are related to the requests for refunds,
Organization of the Thesis
This study is divided into four remaining chapters. The following chapter is a
presentation ofbackground information and the theoretical model used. Chapter III
contains a discussion ofprocedures followed, the mail survey used to obtain data, and the
statistical analysis ofthat data. Results are presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V
6
summarizes the conclusions that address each objective, presents implications, and
contains suggestions for additional research.
7
CHAPTER II
CONCEvruALFRAMEWORK
Introduction
Several studies have been done on free-riding, (Leuthold; Sandler, Sterbenz, and
Posnett; and MaIm) as well as preferences for public goods (Green and Laffont) and group
size effects on support for provision ofpublic goods (Isaac and Walker). Loehman,
Quesnal, and Babb (1996) have presented a theory ofeffects of free-riding on rent-seeking
competitors for public goods.
The economic studies have focused on whether expected benefits from
participation in rent-seeking behavior exceed the costs. Sociologists would incorporate
social sanctions as factors influencing decisions to participate in rent-seeking behavior.
Sanctions can be either fonnal or informal. Informal social sanctions such as "expressions
ofslight disapproval or ostracism" (Coleman, 1990) might exist to enforce a nonn of
either approval or disapproval ofwheat commission contributions. Sociologists have
recognized that sanctions can be ineffective for people at both very high and very low
social standing. People with very low social standing may not respond to sanctions
because negative sanctions carmot cause them to lose social standing. On the other
extreme, those with very high social standings may also not be affected by sanctions from
people "beneath" them in social standing (Coleman, 1990).
The model presented in this chapter is a modified version ofthe model by
Loehrnan, Quesnal, and Babb. The revised model incorporates norms, sanctions and the
8
costs ofrequesting refunds and is adapted to explain decisions to participate in funding
commodity promotion and research programs. The Loehman., Quesnal, and Babb model
will be reviewed first with the modified version following.
Loehman, Quesnal, and Babb Model
The model presented by Loehman., Quesnal, and Babb (LQB) is for a competing
group situation. It is similar to a traditional public good situation in that
1. some individuals in a group must contribute positive amounts in order to obtain a
positive amount ofthe public good;
2. ifthe public good is obtained, the individual benefit received by one individual
does not diminish the amount available to others in the winning group; and
3. ifa group wins, an individual is not excluded from receiving benefits regardless of
the initial contribution (Loehman et al 1996).
In the LQB modeL a fixed reward level is provided for each person in the winning
group. lfthe group does not win, there is no reward. Each individual has the option of
contributing an amount B to the group in an attempt to win the good. TIlls contribution
will increase the probability that the group will win.
In most rent-seeking literature, a known form for probability ofwinning in relation
to contributions is assumed. But the LQB model assumes that an individual has a
subjective probability, or individual belief of the probability ofthe group winning and how
their individual bid (B) will influence the outcome. 1bis may depend on group size (n) and
the reward level (R). 1bis subjective probability is shown as pCB;n,R).
Because the reward may not be monetary, a fimction heR) changes the reward into
a money benefit, heR) = R. Also added to this model is an incentive function g(B) that is
9
-included in the returns ifthe group wins. For example:
g(B»O ifB>B.,
g(B) =0 ifB =B.,
g(B)<O ifB<B ~
where B * is the average bid. 11lls fimction gives an extra amOlUlt to those individuals who
contribute more than average and a smaller benefit to those who contribute less than
average. Utility, then (withM denoting the initial income) if the group wins, is
u{M+h(R)+g(B)-B} and u(M - B) ifthe group does not win.
Utility is maximized to choose the optimum bid:
(1) Max p(B;n,R)u[M + h(R)+g(B)-B]+[I- p(B;n,R)]u(M -B).
The first-order condition for the optimum bid ifB > 0 is:
(2) ap [u(M + heR) +g(B) - B) - u(M - B)] +
aB
p[u'(M +h{R) +g(B) -B)(gf - 1) +u' -1) +u'(M-B)] +u '(M - B)( -1) =0 .
When equation (2) is solved, LQB found that the optimum bid varies according to "the
nature ofthe subjective probability, reward level (R), the type ofpublic good (h), group
size (n), income (M), the nature of the incentive fimcti.on (g), and the nature ofrisk
preferences measured by the Pratt-Arrow coefficient (-u' /u'j."
Although a zero bid is nonnally associated with free-riding, in this model there are
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-conditions where a zero bid is the solution to equation (1). Because the optimum bid is
influenced by a subjective probability, ifan individual believes that the probability of
winning is zero and that an increase in their bid will not change this probability
(P'(B; n,R) = 0) and from equation (2), u'(M - B) = 0, then the first-order condition will
only be satisfied with a bid ofzero. "Thus, a zero bid can be explained on the basis of
subjective probability effects and optimal strategic behavior rather than traditional 'free-
riding'." (Loehman, et al. 1996).
Revised Model
A revised mode~ similar to the LQB model, is created to represent the decisions
that voluntary participants in commodity research and promotion programs make. Every
year that a producer markets a commodity, he or she must decide whether or not to
contribute up to a maximum amolIDt B to promotion and research programs. Changes
required for our application include: 1) unlike LQB, we do not pose two discrete
(win/lose) outcomes; 2) the incentive function g(B) is the monetarized value of social
conscience (positive and negative) as evaluated by the decision maker; 3) the h(fi., B, n)
function (a combination ofp(B; n, R) and h(R)) is the decision maker's subjective
appraisal of the expected rewards from program activities, and 4) since refimds must be
requeste~ there is a cost associated with non-participation. Each ofthe four changes is
discussed below.
The first change is necessary because the rewards are subjectively evaluated and
continuous rather than discrete. The rewards may come from research that generates
11
increased yields, reduces production costs, and/or from promotion activities that increase
demand.
The second change, treating the incentive function g(B) as the monetarized value
ofsocial sanctions evaluated by the decision maker, allows incorporation ofnonns and
social sanctions to enforce nonns in the analysis. The function can take on positive or
negative values indicating the monetary value each decision maker assigns to approval
(positive) or disapproval (negative) of their behavior. Social sanctions would not be
effective ifthe identities ofparticipants and nonparticipants are not widely known.
Here, the incentive function represents monetarized social conscience, including
both positive and negative sanctions as well as personal conscience. Sanctions are
hypothesized to work in many different ways. Positive sanctions could take on the fonn
ofbumper stickers for those producers who contribute or simply the satisfaction of
supporting the commission. Negative sanctions could be disapproval of producers who
are opposed to the commission and try to influence others and their actions. In addition,
producers could also contribute, not because they care what others think ofthem, but
because ofwhat they think ofthemselves , Some producers may lose self esteem if they do
not contribute.
In the LQB model, the subjective probability is the individual's assessment of the
probability that the group would win. In this model, h(R.,B,n) indicates the producers
attitudes and beliefs about both the probability that the commodity commission programs
have positive effects and the size of the effect. In the LQB model? the incentive fimction
was based on the average bid and each individual was either given a higher reward for a
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larger bid or given a lower reward for a lower than average bid. Since R is no longer
fixed, the third change simplifies the LQB model such that the h(R,B,n) function now
incorporates the appraisal ofthe probability ofwhether rewards are positive as well as the
value ofthe reward. Similar to LQB, this appraisal is a function ofgroup size (n) and the
total amount ofthe producers contribution (B). Subjectively evaluated rewards (R) are
increased quantity demanded, increased prices, reduced production costs, and/or increased
yields. In general, the value ofthe reward will. vary directly with volume produced and/or
acreage. Attitudes and beliefs about its size and probability ofoccurance are incorporated
into the function.
Fol.ll1:h" the cost ofrequesting a refund is also potentially important and includes
the cost oftime to process the request and deposit the refimd check. Cost is hypothesized
to be positively related to B and F, the frequency of sales since refimds must be requested
for each transaction. Marginal costs are expected to diminish as B increases because of
the routine and learning associated with handling the transaction.
Amount B in the new model is the assessment per unit on the commodity marketed
times the number ofunits marketed in a year. The total amount is contributed and a
refimd may be requested. Each producer, when making his or her decision, is actually
selecting B that maximizes:
(1) U[M + h(R,B,n) + g(B,n) - B - c(BJl)]
where Mis expected income if the producer does not participate, h(RjJ,n) is the expected
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•value ofreturns to producers, g(B,n) is the producer's social incentive functioJ4 B is the
contribution, and c(B,F) is the cost of requesting a refund. Because most producers make
multiple deliveries and refimds can be requested on each delivery, B can range from zero
to the assessment times the number ofunits delivered.
The first-order condition for this model is:
(2) au =U1[M +h(R,B,n) + g(B n) -B -c(B,F)][ ah(B,R,n) + ag(B,n) -1 - ac(B,F)] ~ 0
aB ' aB aB aB
Rewriting gives:
(3) ah(B,R,n) + ag(B,n) _ ac(B,F) ~ 1.
aB aB aB
In words, the first-order condition suggests that the marginal impact ofB on returns plus
the marginal impact ofB on social conscience minus the marginal cost ofrequesting a
refund must be equal to or greater than the marginal utility ofmoney contributed. The
equilibrium conditions can easily be used to explain why producers do or do not
participate. For example, a nonparticipating producer may not feel that their contribution
(B) has an impact on their returns, R. Producers may feel that either their contribution is
insignificant and has little impact onR and/or that in general B has little impact (short or
long run) on returns (programs are ineffective). That is:
(4) ah(R,B,n) ~ 0 .
aB
14
Lack ofpressure from social conscience can OCCllI if the marginal utility of
conscience is zero or ifnon-participation does not generate social sanctions which would
be represented by:
(5) ag(B,n) = 0 .
aB
The first order condition also suggests that participants are people who believe the
programs generate positive values ofR and that their contributions help the program
work. Participants may also value social conscience and believe that non-participation
generates negative social sanctions or internally generates feelings ofguilt. Participants
may also not know how to request a refund and feel that the cost ofrequesting a refund is
large, relative to the refund amountB.
The theory suggests clearly that programs may be supported in situations in which
producers do not believe their monetary rewards are sufficient to justify the contribution
but the support is the result ofnegative social sanctions or guilt associated with non-
participation.
The theory can also show why people who consider themselves as leaders may
participate. For our purposes, a leader is defined as a person whose contribution B is well
known and may influence whether other producers participate. A leader may feel that the
effect oftheir contribution is larger than for others who are not leaders, since their
decision (B) influences others. A leader who feels their impact is large will participate and
perhaps publicly state their support. A leader, who believes programs are ineffective, may
attempt to socially sanction those who do participate.
15
Hypotheses
The hypotheses previously stated suggest that producers with specific
characteristics, attitude and beliefs will be more or less inclined to support research and
promotion programs. Ifwe can measure attitudes and beliefs about program effectiveness
and susceptibility to social sanctions, we will then be able to test whether support for
research and promotion is primarily due to beliefs about program effectiveness, social
conscience, and/or potential income.
Null hypotheses are derived directly from the first order conditions and include:
Ho: Participation is not related to susceptibility to social sanctions.
Ho: Participation is not related to beliefs about program effectiveness.
Ho: Participation is not related to other producer characteristics (gender, age, education,
bushels harvested).
Given that we can reject one or more ofthe above hypotheses, we can then begin
to characterize people who believe programs are ineffective, believe their contribution is
not important to program success, and/or believe that program participation does not
generate social sanctions. Methods used to test the hypotheses are in Chapter III.
16
>CHAPTER III
PROCEDURES
Introduction
From the theoretical model in Chapter II, it is hypothesized that decisions to
participate in funding commodity promotion and research programs are related to social
sanctions, beliefs and knowledge about programs effects, income, and other producer
characteristics. A cross-sectional survey ofproducers known to participate or not
participate in funding decisions is used to generate data that can be used to test the
hypotheses suggested in Chapter II.
Description of Survey
The questionnaire was administered by mail to 2500 wheat producers in
Oklahoma. The sample was taken by the Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics Service. Of
those 2500,500 producers had requested a refund in the last year. The names ofthese
500 were obtained by the Oklahoma Wheat Commission and are public information.
The questionnaire was developed in conjunction with the Oklahoma Wheat
Commission. It was then pretested with the Commissioners. The final version ofthe
questionnaire consisted of20 questions concerning producers' feelings about wheat
commission activities. A draft copy ofthe questionnaire appears in Appendix A. The
questionnaire includes questions on age, gender, economic background, and other
demographic questions to represent producer characteristics. A section asks for
17
information on producers' knowledge and perceptions ofthe wheat commissions and their
activities. Producers indicate if they are aware of, attend, or read about the activity.
Then, they indicate how much funding should be allotted to each activity. Producers are
also asked to agree or disagree with several statements on the wheat commission1 s
responsibilities.
The first mailing ofthe questionnaire was sent out on April 8, 1998. Seven days
later, a postcard reminder was mailed to all possible respondents. Questionnaires from
213 people who did not request a refund and 56 people who did request a refund were
received. Figure 2 shows the location ofall of the respondents to the survey. The
distribution ofthe respondents resembles the distribution ofwheat production in
Oklahoma.
18
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Figure 2. Location of questionnaire respondents
•Producer Characteristics
Producer characteristics for those who requested a refimd and those who did not
request a refund are shown in Table II.
Ninety-six percent ofthe respondents that requested a refund (group 1) were male
while 93 percent were male that did not request a refund (group 2). The mean ages were
very similar at around 57 years. The mean for education was also similar for both groups
at about 14 years with 96 percent finishing high school and 40 and 49 percent finishing
college, respectively, in the two groups. On the average, the second group had been
farming a little longer than the first group 32.3 years to 29.9 years. The mean farm
acreage mean for the first group was 1574 acres with 66 percent ofthat being in crops,
while group two had amean of 1426 acres with 72 percent of that being in crops. An
average of79 percent ofthose crop acres was planted to wheat (814 acres) for group one,
with group two having an average of65 percent in wheat (667 acres). Those producers
who requested a refund harvested an average of77 percent of their wheat acres (625
acres). Those producers who did not request a refund harvested an average of 71 percent
oftheir wheat acres for grain (472 acres). The surprising and biggest difference is in the
average bushels per acre for each group. Group 1 produced an average of 30,254 bushels
while group 2 produced an average ofonly 16,895 bushels. At the current assessment,
producers requesting refunds would contribute slightly more than $451 while those who
do not request refunds would contribute $252 for programs.
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-Table II, General Descriptiye Information about ProduCers in Study,a
Characteristic
Responses
Gender:
Male
Female
Education:
Average
Finished high school
Finished college
Average Age
Average Income (gross)
Percentage ofincome from wheat
Averages:
Number ofyears farming
Acres
Acres of crop land
Acres ofwheat
Wheat acres harvested for grain
Bushels ofwheat produced in 1997
a. Averages computed from responses only.
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Requested Refund
56
96 percent
4 percent
14.3 years
96 percent
40 percent
56 years
$106,966.29
41 percent
29.9 years
1574 acres
1035 acres
814 acres
625 acres
30]254 bushels
Did Not Request
213
93 percent
7 percent
14.6 years
96 percent
49 percent
57.1 years
$95,838.51
33 percent
32.3 years
1426 acres
1024 acres
667 acres
472 acres
16]895 bushels
....
-Check-off Program Effectiveness
Producers were asked to indicate which check-offprograms they participated in and
then to rate the effectiveness ofthese programs with a one being much less effective than
average through a five being much more effective than average. The wheat check-off
program had a mean of2.56 coming in at just below average effectiveness. Soybeans had
the highest mean at 3.48 with pork coming in next at 3.44 (fable III).
To find out participants' beliefs and opinions about commission activities and related
issues, producers were asked to agree or disagree with 13 statements ranging from
program effectiveness to govenunent aid. Table IV shows the response given most for
each statement and its percentage of the total responses. Some ofthe results present
interesting contrasts. The producers generally agree that milling and baking quality have
been improved and yields have increased because ofresearch (items c and d, Table IV).
They are much less convinced that production costs have decreased or that prices have
increased because ofpromotion efforts (items e and f, Table IV). They do not feel
producers are well infonned and a majority would like to have more infonnation about
wheat commission programs (items I and k, Table IV). They also do not agree with
statements that suggest that commodity research and promotion programs should be
eliminated (item LTable IV).
Producers were asked to indicate how they feel the commission is spending money at
the present time and also what their preferred allocation would be. Results of the
questionnaire and actual allocations are shown in Table V. The number ofresponses to
the question about how fimds should be spent is lower than for many of the other
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-questions. However, responses to questions about how funds should be spent are
consistent with their opinions about the effects of the programs. Producers would allocate
more to research and less to market development efforts reflecting their relatively stronger
beliefthat research has produced results, though some made specific written comments
that suggested that market development is still very important (field notes reported in
Appendix. C). The averages showed public relations should be allocated about 15 percent
ofthe fimds while administrative issues and salaries should only use about 12 percent.
Although some producers believed that salaries were taking most of the money (according
to some responses and comments), when averaged in with other producer's beliefs, the
result was at 27 percent.
Table III. Wheat Check-otIProgram ys. ~~-olll,jff.....Pr.L:io~grlil.:am~lIi.sa_. _
Requested Refimd Did Not Request Refimd
Program Number of Number of
Average Responses Average Responses
Beef 2.36 39 3.14 146
Soybeans 3.00 3 3.56 18
Wheat 1.89 45 2.76 155
Peanuts 1.00 1 2.90 10
Cotton 1.00 I 2.93 15
Pork 2.00 1 3.63 8
Pecans 1.00 2 2.40 5
Lamb n/a none 2.50 4
a. Range: much less effective than average 1, average effectiveness 3, much more effective
than average 5.
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-Table IV. Percentage of RespondentB in Agreement or Disagreement with Statements
about Government Assistance and Program Effectiveness, Question 14.
Statements
a. The government should help farmers.
b. The wheat check-offis like a
contribution to a charity.
c. Fanner-funded variety research has
improved wheat milling and
baking quality.
d. Wheat yields have increased because of
research.
e. Wheat production costs have
decreased because ofresearch.
f Wheat prices have increased because
ofexport promotion.
g. Promotion efforts the OWC funds
through the Wheat Foods
Council are helping increase
the consumption ofgrain based
foods.
h. The OWC represents state wheat
producer' 5 interests.
1. Wheat producers are well-informed
about Wheat Commission
activities.
J. OveraR the Oklahoma Wheat
Commission programs make
farmers better off
k. I would like more information about
Wheat Commission activities.
1. All commodity research and promotion
programs should be eliminated.
m. Contributions to wheat commodity
research and promotion
programs are vohmtaIy.
Disagreea
25
49
10
12
47
48
16
12
41
21
16
71
24
Uncertain
19
18
34
12
23
28
64
31
35
41
29
20
31
Agree
56
33
56
76
30
24
30
58
24
38
55
8
45
,J
~
.~
a. Strongly disagree and disagree are combined. Agree and strongly agree are combined.
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-Table V. Beliefs, Actual and Preferred Allocation ofWheat Commission Funds,
Ouestion IS:
Current
Belief Preferred Actual
Area (%) (%) (%)
a: Production research to improve varieties, pest
contro~ production costs. 28 32 23
b. Market development that includes new product
development, new uses ofwheat, development
ofrecipes, and international market developing
efforts. 30 37 43
c. Producer information and public relations
programs: 15 IS 18
d. Administrative costs (salary, travel., board
expenses): 27 12 16
Social Standing
As stated earlier, informal sanctions such as "expressions of slight disapproval or
ostracism" (Coleman, 1990) might exist to enforce a norm of either approval or
disapproval ofwheat commission contributions. Several producer characteristics like
acreage farmed, age, and memberships in organizations are likely to be related to social
standing. In addition, producers were asked to self-evaluate their social standing. They
were asked to state where they felt their social standing was on a scale of 1-10 willi 1
being the lowest social standing and 10 being the highest social standing. Ofthe
respondents, 42% responded with either a 7 or an 8 which suggests the possibility that
producers may not be affected by negative sanctions from those with a lower standing.
Unfortunately, the low response rate to this question prevented use of this infonTIation in
the model.
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-Econometric Analysis
A logit regression was used to estimate the probability of a producer requesting a
refund. The logit model creates an index which is a linear function ofthe right-hand side
variables (11 = x,fJ). The index has an infinite range and is then translated to a 0-1 range
by using a cumulative density function.
Although the index is linear in X, the probabilities are not. Therefore, in the logit
framework, an equivalent index can be defined using the logistic function:
where
Pt = probability that a producer will request a refund given the knowledge ofvarious
factorsx,;
It = the value of the cumulative logistic function associated with each possible value
ofthe underlying index It" or X13, and
fJ= a vector ofunknown parameters.
The logit model is estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure and measures of
goodness of fit in SHAZAM (White, 1993).
The coefficients show only the change in the independent variable on the index and
not the dependent variable. Therefore to compute the effect for coefficient k the
derivative with respect to each X is taken and is represented by:
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.....
-a~ _ 13t exp(Xt~)
axtt [1 + exp(Xt 13)f
After computing the above, the elasticity calcwation for the kth coefficient is:
E - a~ X/d
/d - (aX/d )(F(XtP))
However in a logit model the elasticity is different for every observation. Therefore, in the
SHAZAM Program used to estimate the fimction, the elasticity is computed at the mean
values (White 1993, p. 253) as:
aPt x letE let = ()( )
ax let F(X tp)
SHAZAM also computes a weighted aggregate elasticity as:
•~
)
•
,
The logit output shows several different ways of computing R2. The two most appealing
ones are the Maddala R-square:
R 2 = 1- exp[ 2L(O)- L(E)/ N]
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-and Cragg-Uhler R-Square:
R 2 _ 1- exp{[ 2£(0) - LeE)] / N}
1 - exp[ 2L(0) / N]
Variables included in the empirical model are chosen to represent the hypotheses and to
avoid questions to which the response rate was low. The empirical model is:
Probt = Po + PI BUSHELS + P2 COMA! + P3 CLUBS + P4 KNOW + Ps ATTEND +
P6 PUB + ~ INFORMED + pg BENEFICIAL + P9 ELIMINATE + P10 VOLUNTARY
where:
Probt = 1 ifa producer requests a refim~ aotherwise;
BUSHELS = number ofbushels ofwheat produced in 1997 ( a continuous variable);
COMAf = 1 ifproducer knows a wheat commissioner, aotherwise;
CLUBS = number ofactivities producer is in ( a continuous variable)~
KNOW = number ofcommission activities producer knows about;
ATTEND = number ofmeetings on activities producer has attended;
PUB = number ofactivities producer has read about;
INFORMED, BENEFICIAL, ELIMINATE, and VOLUNTARY= 1 ifproducer agrees with
statement in questions 14i, 14j, 141, and 14m, (fable IV) respectively, -1 ifproducer
disagrees, 0 otherwise.
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-CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Regression Analysis
The results of the logit analysis to estimate the effects ofproducer characteristics,
knowledge ofcommission activities, attitudes, and beliefs on the probability ofa producer
requesting a refimd are shown in Table VI. Prediction success and measures ofgoodness
of fit are shown in Table VII.
Table VI. Results of Logit model estimation of the probability ofa producer requesting
a refimd.
Asymptotic
Weighted
Independent Estimated Standard Elasticity at Aggregate
Variables Coefficient Error T-Ratio Means Elasticity l~
..
BUSHELS
:1
1.76E-05 6.19E-06 2.8422 0.3169 0.2208
COlvfA1
-0.93256 0.47646 -1.9573 -0.2732 -0.1270
CLUBS -7.63E-02 0.2141 -0.3563 -0.0077 -0.0040
KNOW 5.59E-03 6.66E-02 8.30E-02 3.02E-02 1.74E-02
ATTEND -2.21E-02 0.11988 -0.1846 -2.IOE-02 -1.06E-02
PUB 1.99E-02 6.81E-02 0.2916 7.98E-02 4.69E-02
INFORMED 0.3671 0.2875 1.2769 -4.94E-02 -4.21E-02
BENEFICIAL -1.4113 0.33954 -4.1564 -0.15082 0.1473
ELIMINATE 0.72653 0.3117 2.3307 -0.4055 -0.1832
VOLUNTARY 0.5670 0.2640 2.1480 9.20E-02 8.73E-02
CONSTANT -1.3087 0.45614 -2.8692 -1.1293 -0.6589
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Table VII. Prediction Success for Logit Model ofWheat Producers' Requests for
Refimds and Measures ofGoodness ofFit
Actual
Predicted
o
Number ofright predictions =177
Percentage ofright predictions = 85.9
MadcWa R-square = 0.1998
Cragg-Uhler R-square = 0.31508
McFadden R-square = 0.22165
o
166
8
1
33
11
arepresents producers who did not request a refimd and 1, producers who did request a
refimd.
Preliminary estimation revealed that the primary producer characteristic influencing
request for a refimd was number ofbushels produced. Because oflower response rates
and positive correlation among bushels produced and income, income was not included.
Personal knowledge ofa wheat commissioner and number ofmemberships in clubs are
included to reflect social standing, a propensity to join groups, and potential impact of
social sanctions. Because wheat commissioners review lists ofproducers that request
refimds, knowing a commissioner may mean that a producer is more subject to social
sanction or has more ability to influence commission activities and is less likely to request
a refimd. Membership in clubs is included to reflect a propensity to want to be included in
groups, which could be related to social standing as well. Self-reported social standing is
not included because ofthe low response rate.
Variables are included to indicate knowledge about commission-sponsored
30
-activities (KNOW), attendance of a commission activity ~1TEND), and reading of articles
or publications about commission activities (PUB). These variables represent specific
actions which the commission could encourage.
Variables to indicate beliefs are shown as agreement or disagreement with the
following statements: Wheat producers are well-informed about Wheat Commission
activities (INFORlvfED); Overall, the Oklahoma Wheat Commission programs make
fanners better off(BENEFICIAL); All commodity research and promotion programs
should be eliminated (ELIMINATE) and; Contributions to wheat commodity research and
promotion programs are voluntary (VOLUNTARY).
The results show that among the explanatory variables, probability of requesting a
refund is positively related to BUSHELS, ELIMINATE, and VOLUNrARY. Producers
who market more bushels are more likely to request a refund which suggests that refund
problems may become greater ifaverage farm size continues to increase. Large producers
who know that programs are voluntary, and/or believe that commodity research and
promotion programs should be eliminated have a higher probability of requesting a refund.
Since the process ofrequesting a small refund is the same as the process for a large
refund, the bushels effect could be due to the learning curve associated with knowing how
to request refunds and the dollar amount ofthe refund relative to the cost.
Probability that a producer will request a refund is found to be negatively related
to knowing a commissioner (COMM), and agreement with the statement that the
Oklahoma Wheat Commission programs make fanners better off(BENEFICIAL).
Clearly, the results suggest that one important role for commissioners is to become
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acquainted with producers (particularly large producers) and for the commissions to create
agreement with the belief that programs produce benefits.
However, the ways of creating positive beliefs about the commission and reducing
negative beliefs about commission activities are less clear. Reading about, attending, and
knowing about commission activities had very little impact on whether producers request
refunds. The coefficient for INFORMED is positive but not significant. Unless these
activities change beliefs and attitudes about commission effectiveness they are not likely to
influence refimd request rates. In addition, number ofclub memberships is also not
significant.
To summarize, nwnber ofbushels sold, personal acquaintance with a
commissioner, and producer's opinions and beliefs about wheat commission activities had
the greatest influence on the decision to request a refund.
~odellnterpretaffon
Results in Table VIII give a summary ofhow the probability ofrequesting a refund
is influenced by the discrete variables in the model. The mean responses were used for all
variables in the model and then the discrete variables were assigned integer values. The
conditional probability ofrequesting a refimd with all of the variables at therr means was
0.138 as shown in the first line ofTable VIII.
The next four rows of the table show the effects ofchanging the five discrete
variables one variable at a time. For example, when a producer knows a commissioner
(COMM" variable is changed from 0 to 1), the probability ofrequesting a refund decreases
32
-by 9.7 percent. When producers agree that programs make producers better offas
opposed to disagreeing that programs make fanners better off (BENEFICIAL variable
from 1 to -1) the probability ofrequesting a refund decreases by 39.8 percent, the largest
individual decrease in probability for the discrete variables. Ifproducers disagree that all
commodity research and promotion programs should be eliminated rather than agree that
all commodity research and promotion programs should be eliminated (ELIMINATED
variable from -1 to 1) the probability ofrequesting a refund is 22.9 percent less. The last
row ofthe table shows the effect on probability ofrequesting a refund is 68.4 percent if
both attitudes toward benefits and elimination ofprograms are changed (BENEFICIAL
from -1 to 1 and ELIMINATED from 1 to -1).
Producers who agree that program contributions are voluntary (VOLUNT.ARY=I)
are 12.6 percent more likely to request a refund than are producers who disagree with that
statement (VOLUNT.ARY= -1). Only 45 percent of the respondents agreed with the
statement that contributions are voluntary (Table IV) which suggests that ifproducers
become better informed about program provisions, refund request rates could increase.
The probability results are consistent with the regression model. Ifproducers
agree that they are made better ofIby commission programs and activities, then they are
more likely to participate. However, the problem lies in identi1)ring what makes producers
feel that programs are not beneficial and how the commission can help combat this belief.
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-Table VIII. Conditional Probabilities ofRequesting a Refund
Conditional probability
or change in conditional
probability
0.138
0.097
0.398
0.229
0.126
0.684
Descriptions of conditions or changes in conditions that
affect the probability ofrequesting a refund
Conditional probability ofrequesting a refund with all
variables in the model set at the mean values.
Difference in probability for a producer who does not
know a commissioner, C01vfM = 0 (0.178) and a
producer who knows a commissioner C01vfM= 1 (0.081)
with all other variables at their mean values.
Difference in probability for a producer who agrees with,
BENEFICIAL =1 (0.443) and disagrees with
BENEFICIAL=-l (0.044) programs are beneficial, with
all other variables at their mean values.
Difference in probability for a producer who agrees with,
ELIMINATED=l (0.339) and disagrees with
ELIMlNATED=-1 (0.111) all programs should be
eliminated, with all other variables at their mean values.
Difference in probability for a producer who agrees with,
VOLUNTARY=l, (0.202) and a producer who disagrees
with program contributions are voluntary,
VOLUNTARY- 1, (0.076), with all other variables at
their mean values.
Difference in probability for a producer who agrees that
programs should be eliminated (ELIMINATED=l) and
disagrees that programs are beneficial (BENEFICIAL=-l)
(0.718) with a producer who disagrees that programs
should be eliminated (ELIMINATED=-I) and agrees that
programs are beneficial (BENEFIClAL=l) (0.035).
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-CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions
The general objective ofthis research was to provide information that would help
reduce the number ofrefund requests made by wheat producers to the wheat commission
ofOklahoma.
Based on the results ofthe survey and the logit regression modeL the wheat
commission will have a greater likelihood ofreducing the number of refunds in the state of
Oklahoma by targeting efforts at bettering the commission in the minds ofthe producers.
The specific objective was to determine how economic and social factors,
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs were related to the requests for refunds.
It was found that attitudes and beliefs about the ·effectiveness ofthe commission
and about commodity programs in general have the most influence on requests for
refunds. Specific results for each hypothesis follow.
Hypothesis l: Ho - Participation is not related to susceptibility to social sanctions.
Conclusion: The null hypothesis was not accepted to the extent that personal acquaintance
with a wheat commissioner is a measure ofsusceptibility to social sanction.
Hypothesis 2:Ho - Participation is not related to beliefs about program effectiveness.
Conclusion: The null hypothesis was not accepted. Ifproducers believe programs are
beneficial they are less likely to request refunds and if they believe programs should be
eliminated they are more likely to request a refund.
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-Hypothesis 3: Ho - Participation is not related to other producer characteristics
Conclusion: The null hypothesis was not accepted. Request for a refund was positively
related to bushels produced.
Recall the theoretical model which suggested producers maximize
U[M+ h(R,B,n) + g(B,n) - B - c(B,F)],
their utility. The research shows that producers who request refunds feel that h(R,B,n),
the reward fimction, is zero. Therefore if the social sanction ftmction has little influence
(g(B) = 0, i.e. they do not know a commissioner), producers are likely to request a refund
as long as the refimd amount B is greater that the perceived cost ofrequesting the refund
c(B,F). Many producers see rewards as being high wheat prices. Since at the time of the
survey, the wheat price was historically low, producers requesting refunds may have felt
that there was no reward for contributing to the wheat commission program efforts.
Implications for Program Managers and Commlsslone,rs
Understanding why producers do or do not participate can influence whether
program managers emphasize efforts to increase positive beliefs about program
effectiveness and/or generate positive social sanctions for those who elect to participate in
the program. Simply knowing about, attending or reading publications about programs
does not appear to be enough to influence refund requests unless these activities influence
producers' beliefs. Making personal contacts with large producers would appear to be the
36
-best way that commissioners can influence refimd requests. Commissioners need to be
people who are well known by a large munber ofproducers. Since the research shows
that the producers' beliefs are a key factor in participation or no participation., in-depth
analysis ofthe source ofproducers' negative and positive perceptions of the commission
effectiveness is needed.
The main problem expressed by the producers is that ofa low wheat price.
Although the commission cannot directly influence the price, they must convince the
producers that they are making a significant effort to alleviate the problem ifthey want
continued and new support in the future.
A wheat commission's main goal is to create benefits for producers. To be
effective in this endeavor, commissioners must understand why producers behave the way
they do and confonn their activities to meet the producers where they are. It is important
for commissioners to communicate with their constituents in order to serve them in the
most effective and efficient manner.
Suggestions for Further Research
For future studies, first other states with voli\.ll1tary check-offprograrns should be
analyzed. By expanding to other states, not only can a greater understanding of wheat
farmers be gained, but also commissions and check-offprogram managers can learn from
each other how to better serve their constituents.
The sllIVey may also be more effective if it were simplified to focus on producers
beliefs about research and market development and the sources of their beliefs. Since this
37
-was the factor that most greatly influenced producer?s decisions to request a refund, a
better understanding ofthese beliefs is critical in combating the problem of refunds.
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-APPENDIX A
WHEAT PRODUCER QUESTIONNAIRE
41
-Dear Wheat Producer:
Wheat producers throughout the U.S. participate in check-off programs to support research and
marketing efforts through their state wheat commissions. The purpose of this questionnaire is to
give you the opportunity to provide the Oklahoma Wheat Corrunissioners and staff with feedback
about haw well you understand and support the research and marketing efforts of the Conunission.
This sbJdy is not funded by the Oklahoma Wheat Commission and is an independent evaluation of
their program.
The infonnation you provide is confidential. Summaries of the responses and data provided wiU be
presented to the Wheat Commission to help them plan activities and respond to producer
suggestions.
Should you have questions about this research. please contact Dr. Daniel S. Tilley, Professor l405-
744-6180), Dr. Shida R Henneberry, Professor (405-744-6159), or Ms. Kelley Crowley, Graduate
Research Assistant in Agricultural Economics (405-744-9806). Please return the completed
questionnaire in the attached postage paid envelope. Thank you for your response.
Sincerely,
Daniel S. Tilley
Professor
Kelley Crowley
Graduate Research Assistant
42
Shida R. Henneberry
Professor
1. Gender:
Education Level: (circle one)
Elementary
12345678
High School
9 10 1l 12
2. Age:
College
13141516
Post Grad
17 18 1920+
4. a.
b.
In what county is your farm located? (the majority)
How many years have you operated a farm?
5. How many bushels ofwheat did you producelhanrest last year? _
6. What type of organization best describes your farm business? (circle one)
individually owned partnership corporation
7. What (if any) other enterprises are on your fann? (circle all that apply)
soybeans milo corn cattle peanuts coUon pecans alfalfa
prairie hay other _
8. a. What is your total farm acreage? acres
b. What percentage of your farm is crop land? %
c. What percentage of the land you fanned in 1997 was rented from others? __ %
To others?__%
d. What percentage of the crop land was used for wheat production in 1997? __ %
e. What percentage of those acres were harvested for grain in 1997? __ %
f. Where did you market your grain in 1997? _
9. Do you personally know anyone who has been or is an Oklahoma Wheal Corrunissioner?
yes no
10. To what clubs, civic organizations, or activities do you belong? (circle all that apply)
Lion's Club Fann Bureau OK Association of Wheat Growers Rotary
Elk's Club Moose Lodge Kiwanis other _
11. Have you ever been elected to an office? (i.e. school board, county commissioner) yes no
12. In which of the following (check-off programs) do you participate? Indicate your answer by
circling either yes or no for each program. Please rate your impression of the overall
effectiveness of the promotion and research programs listed. Circle a number from 1 to 5.
Much less Much more
No effective Average effective than
Program Participate? opinion than average effectiveness average
Beef Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
Soybeans Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
Wheal Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
Peanuts Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
Cotton Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
Pork Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
Pecans Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
Lamb Yes No 1 2 3 4 5
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13. The following are activities of the OkJahoma Wheat Commission. (please circle yes or no
for every question in the following table).
Do you Have you Have you read a
know attended a publication or
Wheat Commission Activity about this meeting about article about
activity? this activity? this activity?
a. Producer funding has developed
varieties such as Century, Chickasha,
Tonkawa, Custer, and 2174. Yes No Yes No Yes No
b. Breeding for insect pest and disease
resistance. Yes No Yes No Yes No
c. Wheat quality testing. Yes No Yes No Yes No
d. Improving wheat genetics. Yes No Yes No Yes No
e. Developing alternative uses for wheat,
such as strawboards or packaging
peanuts. Yes No Yes No Yes No
f. Hosting 50+ international visitors in
trade teams that include millers and
bakers. Yes No Yes No Yes No
g. Sponsoring overseas milling and baking
seminars/trade servicing in 140
countries. Yes No Yes No Yes No
h. Participating in quality seminars
overseas- showing buyers the quality of
U.S. hard red winter wheat. Yes No Yes No Yes No
l. Sponsoring Oklahoma Wheatheart
Bread Baking contests. Yes No Yes No Yes No
J. Promoting the Food Guide Pyramid and
the Check Your Six program, to
encourage Americans to consume more
grain-based foods. Yes No Yes No Yes No
k. Helping School Food Service persormel
add more grain based foods to their
school lunches. Yes No Yes No Yes No
1. Regional promotion through events such
as fann shows and Ag Day at the
Capital. Yes No Yes No Yes No
m. Presenting information on bread baking
machines. Yes No Yes No Yes No
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-14. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (place the
corresponding number for each statement.)
Strongly disagree - 1 Disagree - 2 Uncertain. - 3 Agree·4 Strongly Agree· 5
a. The government should help farmers.
b. The wheat check-off is like a contribution to a charity.
c. Farmer-funded variety research has improved wheat milling and baking quality.
d. Wheat yields have increased because of research.
e. Wheat production costs have decreased because of research.
f. Wheal prices have increased because of export promotion.
g. Promotion efforts the OWC funds through the Wheat Foods Council are helping
increase the consumption of grain based foods.
h. The OWC represents state wheat producers' interests.
1. Wheat producers are well-informed about Wheat Commission activities.
J. Overall, the Oklahoma Wheat Commission programs make farmers better off.
k. I would like more information about Wheal Commission activities.
1. All commodity research and promotion programs should be eliminated.
m. Contributions to wheat commodity research and promotion programs are
voluntary.
15. We would like your perception about how Wheal Commission funds are spent. Please
indicate the percentage offunds you think are allocated across the four categories shown in
the first colurrm of the table below.
In the second colunm, please indicate how you would prefer that the funds be allocated
across the four categories:
a. Production research to improve varieties, pest control,
production costs.
b. Market development that includes new product
development, new uses of wheat, development of recipes
and international market developing efforts.
c. Producer information and public relations programs.
d. Administrative costs (salaries, travel, board expenses).
Total
45
Current thinking
or Perception
100 percent
Preferred
Allocation
100 percent
16. Ifyou were an Oklahoma Wheat Corrnnissioner, of the funding spent on wheat production
research, what percentage would you allot to each of the following activities?
Research Activity
a. Wheat variety field testing.
b. Development of insect pest and disease-resistant wheat varieties.
c. Quality testing ofwheat varieties.
d. Development of improved weed control methods.
e. Development of hard white wheat for Oklahoma production.
f. Cooperator-famJer usage of new research technologies.
g. Improving wheat germplasm through wheat genetics to develop
better varieties.
h. Other (please specify), _
Percentage
100 Percent of
Production Research
17. This ladder represents social standing. Place a X on the ladder rung where you perceive
yourself to be.
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
r
!
best possible social standing
worst possible social standing
18. a.
b.
What is your total income, all sources?
Of your income, what percentage comes from wheat fanning? ____%
19. Did you request a refund in the last year? yes no If yes. why? _
20. Do you have additional comments? _
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-APPENDIXB
MODIFICATIONS TO ANSWERS
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-Table IX Average RespOnse or Percentage for Each Variable,a
Questions Mean Questions Mean Questions
Gender 87%-male A14 3,47 D16
Age 56.84 B14 2.77 E16
School 14.02 C14 3.53 F16
Bushels 19497.87 D14 3,88 G16
Soybeans 18% E14 2.67 H16
Milo 26% F14 2.58 Ladder
Corn 4% G14 3.13 Income
Cattle 74% H14 3,51 Income2
Peanuts 3% 114 2.73
Cotton 6% 114 3.15
Pecans 3% K14 3.38
Alfalfa 35% Ll4 2.11
Hay 25% M14 3.28
Acres 1461.13 Cur 15A 27.18%
Crop 70,39% Prel5A 34.53%
From 43.58% Cur15B 29.15%
To 5.29% Pre15B 36.27%
Wht 67.91 % Cur15C 15.16%
Har 72% Pre15C 14.61%
Comm 34% Cur15D 28.11 %
Clubs 1.16 Pre15D 11.91%
Know 6.3 A16 16.50%
Attend 1.03 B16 19.25%
Pub 4.56 C16 11.12%
a Averages reflect all responses including no answer.
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Mean
13.30%
10.45%
10.03%
14.32%
28.32%
6,94
$98,170.54
34,17%
Table X. Summary of Modificatipns Made to Answers for Logit Model
Question Response Changed in Program
to:
1. Gender
2. Age
3. Education Level
4. a. county farm is located in
b. number ofyears farming
5. Number ofbushels produced
6. Type offarm organization
7. Other enterprises on farm
8. a. total farm acreage
b. percent that is cropland
c. percent ofland rented
from others
to others
d. percent of cropland that
is wheat
e. percent ofwheat harvested
f. where grain was marketed
9. Know a commissioner
10. Belong to what clubs
11. Elected to an office
12. Participation in check-off
program; rate effectiveness
13. Knowledge of activity
Attended meeting
Read about activity
14. Opinion statements
male or female
continuous
years ofschool
completed 1-20+
written response
continuous
continuous
individual, partnership,
corp.
yes or no for each one
continuous
1-100%
1-100%
1-100%
1-100%
1-100%
written response
yes Of no
yes or no for each one
yes or no
yes or no participation
1-5 rate ofeffectiveness
yes or no
yes or no
yes or no
1-5 strongly disagree to
strongly agree
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1male, -I female, 0
otherwise
not included
not included
not included
not included
unchanged
not included
not included
not included
not included
not included
not included
not included
not included
not included
1 yes, 0 otherwise
total number of clubs
entered in as a
continous variable
not included
not included
total number ofyes's
entered
total number ofyes's
entered
total nwnber ofyes's
entered
-1 strongly disagree
or disagree, a
uncertain, I agree or
strongly agree
15. FWlds disbursement:
currently
preferred
16. Funding for research
17. Social standing ladder
18. a. total income
b. percentage of income
from wheat
19. Request for refund
20. Comments
percentage
percentage
percentage
1-10 rate
continuous
1-100%
yes or no
written response
so
not included
not included
not included
not included
not included
f10t included
1 yes, 0 otherwise
(dependent variable)
see Appendix C
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COMMENTS
Cormnents made by producers who requested refunds:
I don't see where it has done any good. We are at mercy of traders who are going
to sell our wheat as cheap as possible and wheat commission has done no good. I have
farmed for over 40 years and prices now are the lowest in all that time. Things cannot
continue as at present as I just as well quit as lose what equity I have at present in the
farm. Then somebody speaks to National WG convention once said we need 12 million
acres more wheat to keep our share ofworld market. For what so we can give it away
and traders and handlers make more.
I believe all the money the farmers send just goes into somebodys pocket. They
do not help that much that I have seen. The price ofwheat right now at my local co-op is
$2.84/bu. Now you tell me what good are these people doing to help the farmers.
I don't like your wheat tax that is automatically taken from our check. If someone
wants to donate on their own, thafs fine. All I read is where you folks had your last
convention. All the wheat tax goes to wages and fun. We still have $2.80-3.00 wheat
here in the panhandle. This is 1998 with 1958 prices. Do something about this and I will
Jomyou.
Only in the last few years have I requested a refund. The refund to be used to
support the Okla. Wheat Growers Assoc. Bad government policy can undercut all good
promotional efforts by the commission-case in point- Iran was a good wheat customer
until the White House invoked trade restrictions. We need representation at the gov. level
which the commission by law cannot do. The wheat growers with a very small budget
have been effective. It seems like bad timing to double the assessment when wheat prices
have fallen in the "tank." Doubling the assessment will most likely prompt me to double
my request for a refund. The commission needs to see if they can live within their budget
just like the average wheat farmer has to. To whom is the commission accountable? Has
anyone ever seen a financial statement from the commission?
No point in building markets as government(President Nixon, Ford, Carter) will
ernbargo food as a weapon as it has in the past.
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Something needs to be done about the wheat price. The farmers are going broke.
Wheat price goes down and the expenses rise. Machinery get more expensive.
The wheat commission has been around for about 30 years and hasn't helped the
Oklahoma or the United States fanner - price wise - any at all. Outlaw the checkoff
program. People world wide know what wheat is. Why should the farmers pay the wheat
commission members expenses to travel the world sight-seeing and enjoying nice
banquets?
I do not feel that progress has been made. I am selling wheat for the same price
that it was 40 years ago.
Until the free to farm bill, we had a floor under basic farm crops, i.e. target prices,
EDP, and loan rates. Now we have nothing but the right to go broke! Wheat presently
(4110/98) is below $3.00Ibu on CBT. This is deplorable to say the least. Nobody in our
U.S. is working for what they received 40 years ago.
There should be a voluntary contribution to the wheat commission and not
automatically taken out of our wheat sales check. That removes the voluntary part ofit.
I think it should be voluntary. I don't think they should take your money and then
you have to sign forms and request to get "your" money back. That is wrong!
Ifyou are going to take the money from the farmer when they sell wheat then call
it a tax and accept the role ofthe IRS. The wheat tax is unfair so is the beef tax of
$l.OOlhd. The tax is always put on the farmer! ie. - wheat~ beeftax, school tax, ad
valorem and so on. Also we never set the price for our product like most producers in the
U.S.
Seems to be a wheat farmer subsidized social organization.
I do not like my hard-earned dollar taken from me by a group ofpeople I did not
vote for or against. It's another tax.
Last year the crop was very bad and all I heard from the OWC was that they were
not going to get as much money as always so let's raise the limit and they did! They did
not care if the farmer went broke as long as they kept getting their money. It's the same
with beefcomm.
Took out FSA loan and was deducted then. My understanding was it would be
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deducted again when I sold wheat on market.
Wheat at $3.00. You really think you're helping me. You should be fired.
What would help is a massive campaign about how cheap wheat is. People don't
understand what a gift Pillsbury, Post, Kelloggs, etc. have had. Reckon they made a little
money.
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Comments made by producers who did not request a refund:
Most of#16 could be researched by chemical manufacturers and land grant
colleges. (Only colleges should receive $ from OWC for this research.)
In years past, the United States has went to other countries to show them how to
be self sufficient with crop production. I believe we should show them how to make
money so they can buy our commodities and pay for them instead of loans that are
eventually written off.
Ifwe don't improve our status in the world-wide wheat market, there will not be a
need for the Oklahoma Wheat Commission or the National 'Wheat Growers. There is a
serious danger that the family farm will no longer exist in this country. The basic reason is
that the farmer has absolutely no control over prices received for products sold. You
cannot name another business in the Unite States with less control ofits prices.
Please continue to help wheat production on the high plains.
What a sad deal for wheat farmers $2.82/bu. If their research on marketing was
successful, the price should be better. I'm not totally sold on OK wheat commission.
Research and promotion are important to the future of or survival ofwheat as
grain to be used world-wide and survival on the world market area.
Why can't co-op market direct to overseas customers. Direct market could
improve quality to customer, and improve return to wheat farmer.
Wheat producers cannot keep producing wheat for $3.00/bu. A combine new
costs $150,000 and new 4 wheel drive tractor is $150,000. The only alternative I see is to
grow something other than hard red winter wheat. I am growing more milo (grain
sorghum each year). It matures in four months - wheat takes 10 months. This is what
helps my cash flow and return on my investment. Wheat fanners are currently doomed
with low prices and high costs.
Most of the fanners plus myself are trying to figure out what we can plant besides
wheat. We have the same amount of alfalfa as wheat. I wonder why I even plant wheat,
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by the time all cost is put in, we're not making any money on wheat.
You can't see the forest because the trees are in the way_ A few bushels ofwheat
doesn't make any difference. We are losing. Look at the old farmers. the abandoned
farms, towns closing up. There's nothing left and who cares.
The idea ofthe u.s. govt. to settle the great plains started good. But by the 30's
farmers were leaving. I'm 45 and I've seen farmers dying, going bankrupt, and divorcing.
Leaving for whatever reason whole sections ofcounties were nobody's living anymore
because the roads are so bad, you can't use them when its wet. Many fanners are tired.
They see a small bridge not 10 foot long closed on a county road 1 mile from their house.
And then you pick up the paper and a new 14 million $ six lane is around OKC or theyve
just finished new Perkins Road. So you see farmers just don't have time wony about the
owe.
It's hard for me to understand why wheat is selling for the same price as ofwas
during the late 40's. Tractors, combines. and equipment has went up 50 times what they
were selling for in the late 40's. This is the biggest problem wheat producers have not
better varieties. Parity is a must ifwe are ever going to get the fanner back on track.
After visiting several European countries and talking with some of their fanners, I
concluded that the quality ofwheat that we take to the elevator is not the same quality
that their millers receive because ofsub-standard exporting regulations. This alone could
be hurting our ability to compete in a world market.
Stop big grain companies from shipping and adding foreign material to wheat
exported to other countries.
Wheat commission should spend money on marketing wheat - price is too cheap.
If they have been working on this. then they are failing.
We cannot compete with cheap labor and land in other countries.
Need to influence Washington policies more.
I don't think doubling the checkoff is a wise move.
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Wheat farming in my operation is for pasture #1, grain #2. Cost ofproduction has
been $6.00Ibu for last 5 years. Because oflow yields from freeze damage and disease
can't stay in this business with expenses exceeding income. In my opinion Okla wheat
commission has not had positive affect on wheat prices.
I feel the wheat checkoff should be voluntary not collected and then ask for a
refimd. As it is now the checkoff is an added tax.
The "world market" drives the price ofwheat, not what you or anyone else does.
I can't believe that you are so worried about your org. You need to take our funds
and get some legislation bought in Congress while we still have a little money to give you,
or when the price ofgrain is low enough it won't make a what you do
I am hard pressed to agree on additional checkoffthat is a higher percentage. I
think the only people that know about OWC are the members themselves. I went to one
meeting a few years ago and vowed never to waste my time doing that again, especially
when I saw how cut and dried everything was.
Income from 2 professional careers (teacher, attomey(farming)). We would be
glad to work with OSU on the Wheat Commission.
Elevators are reluctant to fill out forms ifyou market wheat more than once a year.
Every farmer requesting refimd has their names passed around the county and state.
Too much is spent on trips and parties for staff such as Anna Bell, that is political
and does not sell any wheat.
Pretty depressing to think about $3.00Ibu wheat in 1998.
r think the owe should be concentrating more on what we are going to do with
all our wheat we produce and especially the price as ofnow. We can produce more and
more wheat each year but what are we going to do with it except to pay storage to an
elevator.
Two eighty-six wheat. What are they doing to promote higher price sales? Giving
whet away for pennies is getting old.
Everyone has to eat. Let them pay for it. Set minimum price or dump in ocean.
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Fanners get #*$& little percent ofcash flow.
I am very concerned about corporate pig fanning coming into our area. I am
concerned about my property values and the air pollution. I am already faced with it in
Texas Co. I have signed up my land Texas Co. into CRP.
I sold my first wheat crop in 1952 for $2.34. I sold wheat 3 days ago for $2.91.
Production costs have increased at least 10 times in that period. This doesn I t speak too
well for the wheat commission.
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